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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2013, the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free
Trade Zone (Shanghai FTZ) officially opened.2 The Shanghai FTZ
offers a number of special rules and potential advantages as a
location in mainland China for investments from foreign
enterprises.3 In October 2013, in conjunction with the establishment
of the Shanghai FTZ, the Shanghai International Arbitration Center
4
(SHIAC) set up the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Court
of Arbitration (FTZ Arbitration Court) to resolve disputes in the
Shanghai FTZ that relate to investment, trade, finance, intellectual
property and real estate. 5 The FTZ Arbitration Court was
established in the hopes that it will play a role in attracting foreign
investment into the Shanghai FTZ, as arbitration is seen as a more
desirable dispute resolution option than Chinese domestic courts.6

2

See Associated Press in Beijing, China opens Shanghai free-trade zone, THE GUARDIAN
(Sept. 29, 2013, 7:40 AM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/29/chinashanghai-free-trade-zone/.
3
See China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone - A new era of opening up and reform in
China, PWC CN (Nov. 2013),
http://www.pwccn.com/home/eng/sh_pftz_paper_nov2013.html.
4
Upon the approval by the Shanghai Municipal Government and with the agreement of the
Shanghai Commission for Public Sector Reform, the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission Shanghai Sub-commission (CIETAC Shanghai) officially
became the Shanghai International Arbitration Center (SHIAC) in 2013. SHIAC currently
has a panel of more than 600 arbitrators, of which almost 200 are from foreign countries.
See Introduction, SHIAC, http://www.shiac.org/English/About.aspx?tid=2 (last visited Dec.
1, 2014).
5
See Announcement of The China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Court of Arbitration,
SHIAC (Oct. 30, 2013) available at
http://www.shiac.org/English/Announcement.aspx?nid=573 (announcing the establishment
of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Court of Aribtration as open for operations).
6
See Zhou Wenting, Shanghai FTZ tribunal opens to boost trade, CHINA DAILY (last
updated Nov. 6, 2013, 12:33 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/201311/06/content_17083787.htm (reporting the opening of the Shanghai Free Trade
Zone tribunal which will provide judicial services to investors in the zone.).
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On April 8, 2014, SHIAC published a new set of arbitration
rules, the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone Arbitration Rules
(FTZ Arbitration Rules),7 effective on May 1, 2014.8 The FTZ
Arbitration Rules are intended to apply to contractual and other
disputes over rights and interests in property whether or not they are
related to the Shanghai FTZ.9 Moreover, the FTZ Arbitration Rules’
expedited arbitration mechanism introduces several distinctive
reforms favorable to foreign businesses operating in China and
should come as welcome news to businesses eager to avoid drawnout legal battles.10
The FTZ Arbitration Rules will apply where (a) the parties
have agreed to refer their disputes to SHIAC and have opted for the
FTZ Arbitration Rules to apply to the parties, legal facts, or subject
matter of the dispute concerning the Shanghai FTZ, unless the
parties agree otherwise; or (b) the parties have agreed to refer
disputes to the FTZ Arbitration Court or have referred disputes to
SHIAC to be conducted by the FTZ Arbitration Court, unless the
parties agree otherwise.11
There are a number of differences between the FTZ
Arbitration Rules and other institutional arbitration rules in China.12
The main differences are that the FTZ Arbitration Rules contain:
Broader provisions for interim relief, including pre-arbitration
interim relief;

7

Zhongguo (Shanghai) Ziyou Maoyi Shiyanqu Zhongcai Guize (中国（上海）⾃自由贸易
试验区仲裁规则) [China（Shanghai）Pilot Free Trade Zone Arbitration Rules]
(promulgated by SHIAC, effective May 1, 2014)
http://www.shiac.org/ENGLISH/Guide.aspx?tid=12&nid=616 [hereinafter FTZ
Arbitration Rules].
8
See Zhou Wenting, FTZ arbitration rules published, CHINA DAILY (Apr. 9, 2014,
07:15AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-04/09/content_17417152.htm.
9
See Jelita Pandjaitan & Justin Tang, Shanghai Free Trade Zone implements modern
arbitration rules, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (July 2, 2014),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/07/02/shanghai-free-trade-zone-implementsmodern-arbitration-rules.
10
See Matthew J. Zito, Shanghai FTZ Paves the Way for Arbitration Reform in China,
CHINA BRIEFING (June 20, 2014), http://www.chinabriefing.com/news/2014/06/20/shanghai-ftz-paves-way-arbitration-reform-china.html.
11
Pandjaitan & Tang, supra note 9.
12
Other institutional arbitration rules in China include: China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Arbitration Rules, SHIAC Arbitration Rules,
and Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) Arbitration Rules.
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Provisions for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator to
rule on applications for urgent interim relief before the constitution
of the tribunal in the main proceedings (Emergency Arbitrator
Procedure);
More substantive provisions regarding the appointment of
arbitrators from outside SHIAC's panel of arbitrators (Open-List
Arbitrator Appointment);
Expanded provisions for the consolidation of arbitrations
and joinder of parties;
Express provisions for mediation to be conducted by a
mediator, as an alternative to the tribunal conducting the mediation,
and the establishment, by SHIAC, of a panel of mediators; and
A de minimis threshold of RMB 100,000 for the summary
procedure to apply under which the dispute will be determined by a
sole arbitrator and an award rendered within 3 months (rather than
within 6 months under the standard procedure) 13, and a small claims
procedure for claims that do not exceed RMB 100,000. 14
This paper focuses on two of the new features of the FTZ
Arbitration Rules mentioned above: emergency arbitrator procedure
and open-list arbitrator appointment. This paper examines these
two new features in detail through a particular lens, a comparative
analysis of how various sets of institutional arbitration rules in the
world, including the FTZ Arbitration Rules, address the issues
associated with emergency arbitrator procedure and open-list
arbitrator appointment.
Section I.A will establish the conceptual ground for
emergency arbitrator procedure with a particular focus on the
fundamental principles transcending different institutional
arbitration rules. Section I.B will explore in detail how three major
arbitration institutions’ rules govern emergency arbitrator procedure,
namely the International Chamber of Commerce Rules (ICC Rules),
the International Centre for Dispute Resolution Rules (ICDR Rules),
and the Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rules (SIAC

13

See Pandjaitan & Tang, supra note 9 (parenthetical needed) .
See Friven Yeoh, et al., Arbitrating Under SHIAC's New China (Shanghai) Pilot Free
Trade Zone Arbitration Rules, O'MELVENY & MYERS (Jun. 16, 2014),
http://www.omm.com/arbitrating-under-shiac-new-china-shanghai-pilot-free-trade-zonearbitration-rules/ (highlighting key features under the new FTZ Rules).

14

70

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7

Rules). 15 Section I.C will discuss the provisions in the FTZ
Arbitration Rules governing emergency arbitrator procedure, while
comparing these provisions to the relevant provisions in ICC Rules,
ICDR Rules, and SIAC Rules. Section I.D will conclude with a few
suggestions for further refinement of the provisions regarding
emergency arbitrator procedure under the FTZ Arbitration Rules.
Section II.A will introduce two basic party-appointed methods of
arbitrator appointment in institutional arbitration practice, namely
closed-list arbitrator appointment and open-list arbitrator
appointment. Section II.B will assess the pros and cons of each
method of arbitrator appointment and compare them with each other.
Section II.C will demonstrate Chinese arbitration institutions’ longtime practice of using closed-list arbitrator appointment. Section
II.D will discuss the new provisions in the FTZ Arbitration Rules
that have adopted open-list arbitrator appointment for the first time
among all Chinese arbitration institutions and will make
recommendations for refinement.

II. EMERGENCY ARBITRATOR PROCEDURE
A. Conceptual Background for Emergency Arbitrator Procedures
International arbitration has grown significantly in the last
50 years as commercial parties seek to minimize the potential
uncertainties of local litigation procedures. 16 Unlike traditional
litigation, international arbitration is completely voluntary.17 The
arbitral tribunal's power over the parties derives directly from the

15

Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
effective Jan. 1, 2012) http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-andADR/Arbitration/ICC-Rules-of-Arbitration/, art. 29, app. V [hereinafter ICC Rules];
Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC),
effective Apr. 1, 2013) http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules, art. 26, sched.1 [hereinafter SIAC
Rules]; International Arbitration Rules (promulgated by the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (ICDR), effective May 1, 2006)
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_002037, art. 37
[hereinafter ICDR Rules].
16
See Frank M. Young, III, International Commercial Arbitration, Southern Style, 74 ALA.
LAW. 119, 119 (2013).
17
See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2008).
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parties' arbitration agreement.18 Moreover, international arbitration
is a private dispute resolution system and parties to an international
arbitration agreement have control over many different procedural
elements that are invariably beyond their control when litigating a
dispute in court.19 These elements include control over the number
of arbitrators, the choice of the arbitrators (or at least the manner in
which they will be chosen),20 whether the arbitration will take place
through an arbitration institution or be conducted ad hoc,21 where
the arbitration will take place, 22 and the language in which the
arbitration will be conducted. 23 Arbitration ensures that neither
party has a “home court advantage,” thereby creating a more neutral
forum than a court in either party's country could offer.24
Although international arbitration in general has many
advantages over resolving conflicts through litigation, the
international arbitration process does have some shortcomings,
including the inability of parties to appeal decisions, limited
discovery, and the limited power an arbitrator has to force
compliance with deadlines and other requests.25 In addition to these
disadvantages, arbitration institutions historically did not offer a
remedy in cases where emergency relief was necessary prior to the
formation of the tribunal—a process that can take months.26 This
can be a dangerous position to be caught in as it is at this crucial
point that a party will likely be most desperate to obtain interim
relief. This creates the most significant interim relief problem in
international arbitration.27 If a party has already applied to begin an
arbitration proceeding but an arbitral tribunal has not been
appointed, the party faces two challenges before obtaining any type
of relief. First, a tribunal has to be appointed and second, the actual
18

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
20
Id. at 42–3.
21
Id. at 9.
22
See MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (2008) at 43.
23
Id. at 43–4.
24
Id. at 1.
25
Id. at 4–5. For a discussion regarding the advantages and disadvantages of international
arbitration, see also RICHARD GARNETT ET AL., A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2000).
26
See William Wang, Note, International Arbitration: the Need for Uniform Interim
Measures of Relief, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1059, 1080 (2003).
27
Id.
19
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arbitration proceedings must take place.28 These challenges tend not
to bode well for a party seeking emergency relief before the
arbitration proceedings.29
“If a party cannot obtain pre-tribunal emergency relief
through arbitration, [the party] is forced to turn back to the courts,”30
an option with many drawbacks. For example, the relief sought
may not be available; court proceedings may be public, lengthy, and
costly, and may veer in unexpected directions; furthermore, a
foreign party may fear that a national court will be biased in favor
of its nationals. 31 Therefore, as the demand for interim relief
escalates, many arbitration institutions have recently begun to offer
a solution to protect the rights of the parties during the critical
period between filing a case and constituting the tribunal. 32 In
general, arbitration institutions have developed two procedures to
address this situation: (1) expediting the formation of the tribunal;
and (2) appointing an emergency arbitrator specifically authorized
to hear the application before the tribunal is formed.33 While both
procedures are viable solutions, most arbitration institutions prefer
the use of emergency arbitrator procedure to determine applications
for interim relief before the arbitral tribunal is constituted. As a
result, most major arbitration institutions have revised their rules
accordingly to incorporate procedures for the appointment of
emergency arbitrators.34
Emergency arbitrator procedure enables parties to seek
interim relief prior to the formation of the tribunal, without having
to resort to national courts.35 As emergency arbitrator procedure has
28

See Erin Collins, Pre-Tribunal Emergency Relief in International Commercial
Arbitration, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 105, 108 (2012).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
See Guillaume Lemenez & Paul Quigley, The ICDR’s Emergency Arbitrator Procedure
In Action, Part I: A Look at the Empirical Data, 63-OCT DISP. RESOL. J. 60, 62 (2008).
32
See Martin Davies, Court-Ordered Interim Measures in Aid of International
Commercial Arbitration, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 299, 300–3 (2006) (exp paren); see also
Collins, supra note 27, at 108.
33
See Peter J.W. Sherwin & Douglas C. Rennie, Interim Relief Under International
Arbitration Rules and Guidelines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 317,
321–2 (2009).
34
See Grégoire Marchac, Interim Measures in International Commercial Arbitration
Under the ICC, AAA, LCIA and UNCITRAL Rules, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 123, 126
(1999).
35
Id.
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become an increasingly popular tool, it is worthwhile to highlight
some fundamental concepts embedded in various institutional
arbitration rules. First, most arbitration institutions apply the
provisions of the emergency arbitrator only to parties that are either
signatories of the arbitration agreement that is relied upon or
successors to such signatories.36 “This rule was designed to exclude
investment treaty arbitrations and to prevent possible abuse by third
parties.”37 Notably, most emergency arbitrator provisions will not
apply by default to every arbitration.38 Rather, most emergency
arbitrator provisions only apply if a number of other conditions exist.
In particular, the emergency arbitrator provisions will not apply
when the parties agreed to opt out of the respective provisions, or
when the parties agreed on some other emergency relief procedure.39
Second, emergency arbitrator or other type of interim relief is
usually sought by a party who,
[B]elieves it will suffer imminent harm due to an
irreparable alteration of the status quo. Examples
include the adversary's continued violation of
copyright or patent rights or misappropriation of
trade secrets; danger to party property in the
custody of the adversary; and danger that the
adversary will dispose of its own property, leaving
the party without a meaningful chance of recovery
in arbitration.40
Third, another issue of interest is the impact of emergency
arbitrator procedure on the concurrent jurisdiction of a competent
court or the arbitral tribunal. As for court proceedings, emergency
arbitrator procedure is not envisaged to represent an exclusive
remedy and, in general, the option of (or indeed submission to)
those proceedings does not operate as a waiver of judicial authority
over the matter.41 In respect to the arbitral tribunal, jurisdiction is
36

See e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(5).
See Dieter A. Hofmann, New Rules on International Arbitration, FOR THE DEFENSE 12,
14–5 (May 2012).
38
Id.
39
See e.g., ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(6).
40
See Ira. M. Schwartz, Interim and Emergency Relief in Arbitration Proceedings, 63APR DISP. RESOL. J. 56, 58 (2008).
41
See Richard Allan Horning, Interim Measures of Protection, Security for Claims and
Costs; Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (In Toto), 9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
155, 163–4 (1998); see also Sheppard& Townsend, Holding the Fort Until the Arbitrators
37
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entirely protected. Most institutional arbitration rules are clear that
orders or awards of emergency arbitrators do not bind the
subsequently constituted arbitral tribunal, and that those tribunals
are empowered to reconsider, modify, terminate or annul the order
or award of an emergency arbitrator.42
Finally, assuming that a party is awarded the relief it seeks, the
next key issue that arises is enforcement. Questions remain
regarding the applicability of national arbitration laws to pre-arbitral
procedures and the extent to which courts will enforce orders or
awards made by emergency arbitrators.43 None of the many arbitral
rules limit arbitrators to the traditional remedies provided in the
procedural law of the place of arbitration. However, it should be
noted that the enforcement of innovative measures could prove
difficult if the state where enforcement is sought is not familiar with
these kinds of interim measures.44 Ultimately, this will likely turn
upon whether emergency arbitrators are deemed to be “arbitrators,”
for the purposes of arbitration legislation, granting relief in the
course of “proceedings.” 45 Alternatively, there is a purposive
approach, which recognizes that the primary purpose of arbitration
legislation is to respect the parties’ agreement to arbitrate their
disputes, and this would appear to lend support in favor of the
enforcement of emergency arbitrators’ orders and awards.46
B. Emergency Arbitrator Procedure Under ICC, SIAC and ICDR
Rules

Are Appointed: The New ICDR International Emergency Rule, 61-JUL DISP. RESOL. J. 74,
76 (2006).
42
See Horning, supra note 41, at 165.
43
See Marianne Roth, Interim Measures, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 425, 425 (2012); see also
Marchac, supra note 34, at 128.
44
See Marchac, supra note 34, at 128.
45
Generally, arbitrators have
[W]ide discretion in deciding whether the requested measure is
appropriate or necessary. The recent trend of arbitral rules and
national arbitration acts is to vest the arbitrators with express powers to
order interim awards. As an exception to this general tendency,
however, some national laws still accord exclusive jurisdiction to order
interim measures to their domestic courts, such as Finland, Greece,
Italy, and Thailand . . . .”
Marchac, supra note 34, at 129. See also ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 28(1) (2012);
ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 21(1) (2006)..
46
See MARTIN DOMKE ET AL., DOMKE ON COM. ARB. § 24:6 (2014).
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As emergency arbitrator procedure has developed as a
common practical alternative, many arbitration institutions have
adopted some type of rules to address a party's need for emergency
relief.47 These rules vary in comprehensiveness and in strategy.
The emergency arbitrator rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce International Court of Arbitration (ICC), the Singapore
International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), and the American
Arbitration Association International Center for Dispute Resolution
(ICDR), are discussed below.
The International Chamber of Commerce International Court of
Arbitration
In 1990, the ICC launched its “Pre-Arbitral Referee
Procedure”—arguably the first attempt by a major arbitration
institution to provide emergency relief procedure prior to the
constitution of the tribunal.48 While the 1998 revision of the ICC
Rules added provisions allowing applications for urgent measures to
be made directly to courts, the ICC’s most recent amendments
provide the ICC Rules with an internal mechanism for dealing with
emergency arbitrator procedure.49
On January 1, 2012 these latest amendments became effective. The
ICC's emergency arbitrator (ICC’s EA) rules are found in Article 29
of ICC Rules and supplemented by Appendix V50. Article 29,
contains some general rules about when emergency arbitration
procedure is appropriate, but refers to Appendix V for specific
information on the procedure for an application for an emergency
arbitrator.51 This new set of rules contains the most comprehensive
set of emergency relief procedures of all institutional arbitration
rules.52
The ICC’s EA rules are extremely detailed. First, ICC’s EA
rules apply automatically to parties that have opted to arbitrate their
dispute under the ICC Rules with specific requirements to be met:
(a) the application is submitted prior to the transmission of the file
47

See Wang, supra note 26, at 1075.
See Hofmann, supra note 37, at 12.
49
See Shai Wade et al., The Revised ICC Arbitration Rules: Seeking Greater Efficiency
and Transparency, 28 No. 1 CORP COUNS QUARTERLY ART 1 (2012).
50
ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29, app.V.
51
Id.
52
See Collins, supra note 28, at 115.
48
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to the arbitral tribunal; (b) the arbitration agreement was concluded
after January 1, 2012; and (c) there is no agreement of the parties to
opt-out of emergency arbitrator procedure. 53 Second, ICC’s EA
rules are not intended to prohibit any party from seeking urgent
interim or conservatory measures from a competent judicial
authority.54 Third, in order to avoid misuse of ICC’s EA rules, the
application of the rules has been narrowed to situations where a
party seeks relief that truly cannot wait for the constitution of an
arbitral tribunal. 55 Fourth, only signatories to the arbitration
agreement or their successors can invoke ICC’s EA rules,56 which
provides the responding party with a certain degree of protection.
Finally, Appendix V dictates that the appointment of an emergency
arbitrator should take place as soon as possible, normally within two
days of receipt of the application.57 If a party wishes to challenge an
appointment, it must do so within three days of receipt of the
appointment. 58 After the appointment is made, the emergency
arbitrator must establish a procedural timetable for the proceedings
as soon as possible, normally within two days of getting the file.59
Under the ICC’s EA rules, an emergency arbitrator’s decision is
rendered in the form of an order,60 which is binding on the parties
and which the parties must undertake to comply with.61 Since the
ICC’s EA rules are silent on the enforcebility of an order issued by
emergency arbitrors, it is unclear whether such orders have the same
legal effect as an order for interim measures rendered by an arbitral
tribunal.
The Singapore International Arbitration Center
The SIAC was established in 1991.62 The rules the SIAC is
currently using went into force on April 1, 2013.63 Under the SIAC
Rules, the parties may seek interim relief prior to the constitution of
53

ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(56).
Id. art. 29(7).
55
Id. art. 29(1).
56
Id. art. 29(5).
57
Id. app. V, art. 2(1).
58
Id. app. V, art. 3.
59
ICC Rules, supra note 15, app. V, art. 5(1).
60
ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(2); Id. app.V, art. 6(1).
61
ICC Rules, supra note 15, art. 29(2); Id. app.V, art. 6(6).
62
See About Us, SIAC, http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-33-43/about-us (last visited
Apr. 23, 2014).
63
See Our Rules, SIAC, http://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules (last visited Apr. 23, 2014) (exp).
54
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the tribunal.64 Schedule 1 to the SIAC Rules provide that a party in
need of relief may make an application for emergency interim relief
prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, provided it is done
concurrently with or following the filing of a Notice of Arbitration.65
It should be noted from the outset that these procedures apply to the
relevant arbitration agreements by default, meaning that there is no
requirement for the parties to opt in to their availability.66
The Chairman of SIAC must appoint an emergency
arbitrator within one business day of receipt of the application.67
The emergency arbitrator then must, within two business days of
appointment, establish a schedule for considering the application.68
The emergency arbitrator has the “power to order or award any
interim relief that he deems necessary.”69 He also has the power to
“modify or vacate an interim award or order for good cause
shown,”70 but has no more power after the tribunal is constituted.71
Although the SIAC Rules provides an emergency arbitrator with
broad discretionary powers to award any interim relief deemed
necessary, the emergency arbitrator has no power to act after the
tribunal is constituted, and any relief granted by the emergency
arbitrator expires and ceases to be binding after 90 days if the
tribunal is not constituted.72 Additional jurisdictional protection is
afforded to the subsequently-constituted tribunal, as it is not bound
by any determination made by the emergency arbitrator. The
tribunal can reconsider, modify or vacate any interim award or relief
issued by the emergency arbitrator.73 The expiration of the order or
award rendered by the emergency arbitrator is unique under the
SIAC's rules.
In terms of uncertainties over whether orders and awards
made by emergency arbitrators are enforceable or not, the Singapore
Parliament introduced amendments to the International Arbitration
64

SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1.
SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(1).
66
See Collins, supra note 28, at 111-2.
67
SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(2).
68
SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(5).
69
SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(6).
70
Id.
71
SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(7).
72
Id.
73
Id.
65
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Act (“IAA”) on April 9, 2012.74 The amendments make clear that
awards and orders given by emergency arbitrators are enforceable in
Singapore.75 The amendments have accorded emergency arbitrators
the same legal status as that of a regularly-constituted arbitral
tribunal. This legislative amendment distinguishes Singapore from
other jurisdictions as it provides clarity that is otherwise unavailable
in most other jurisdictions. 76 It should be noted, however, that
uncertainty remains as to the enforceability of orders and awards
outside Singapore.77
The American Arbitration Association International Center for
Dispute Resolution
The ICDR was founded by the American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”) in 1996 to provide international access to the mediation
and arbitration services provided by the AAA. 78 The ICDR
administers all of the AAA's international matters and the ICDR
Rules apply whenever the parties' agreement calls for AAA
arbitration but does not choose a particular set of AAA rules.79
The ICDR provides a pre-tribunal emergency arbitrator
procedure whereby parties may, in urgent situations, apply to the
ICDR to seek relief prior to the formation of the tribunal.80 This
emergency arbitrator procedure is outlined in Article 37 of the
ICDR Rules.81 Article 37(a) states that it applies to all arbitrations
under the ICDR Rules that are “conducted under arbitration clauses
74

See Subramanian Pillai & Kaushalya Rajathurai, Singapore: Recent Amendments to the
International Arbitration Act, MONDAQ,
http://www.mondaq.com/x/179938/International+Courts+Tribunals/Recent+Amendments+
to+the+International+Arbitration+Act/(last updated June 3, 2012).
75
Id. (extending the scope of the definition of “arbitral tribunal” will be extended to
expressly include Emergency Arbitrators appointed subject to, and in compliance with, the
rules of arbitration agreed. This serves to clarify that any interim measures ordered by an
Emergency Arbitrator will be enforceable by the High Court.)
76
See Julian Wallace & Glen Rosen, Recent Amendment to the International Arbitration
Act and Their Influence on the Insurance Industry, SIAC, http://www.siac.org.sg/2013-0918-01-57-20/2013-09-22-00-27-02/articles/199-recent-amendments-to-the-internationalarbitration-act-and-their-influence-on-the-insurance-industry (last visited Dec. 2, 2014).
77
Id.
78
See About The American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution (ICDR), AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
http://www.adr.org/about_aaa (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
79
Id.
80
See Guillaume Lemenez & Paul Quigley, The ICDR's Emergency Arbitrator Procedure
in Action, Part II: Enforcing Emergency Arbitrator Decisions, 63-NOV DISP. RESOL. J. 66,
66 (2008).
81
ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37.
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or agreements entered on or after May 1, 2006.” 82 For all
agreements entered prior to May 1, 2006, the parties must
specifically agree to Article 37's emergency arbitrator procedure in
order for it to apply83. For all agreements entered on or after May 1,
2006, Article 37 applies unless the parties opt out of it in their
arbitration agreement. 84 Some have suggested that this feature
“favorably distinguishes” the ICDR procedure “from other opt-in
mechanisms for obtaining interim relief, which are seldom used.”85
Article 37 of the ICDR Rules also applies when the parties’
agreement provides for arbitration before the ICDR, whether or not
they have designated the ICDR Rules.86 In addition, these rules
apply to international arbitrations whenever the parties’ agreement
calls for AAA arbitration but does not choose a particular set of
AAA rules. 87 The ICDR does not define what constitutes an
international arbitration.88 Given the broad scope of international
arbitration, ICDR Rules and Article 37, as a practical matter, can
possibly apply to disputes involving parties from different countries,
or touch upon international issues, whether they are legal or factual.
When a party applies through the emergency arbitrator provisions
under the administration of the ICDR, a party must initially submit a
written emergency relief application to the ICDR specifying the
type of emergency relief that it is seeking, why that relief is
necessary, and why the party is entitled to that relief.89 After the
application, a single emergency arbitrator from a special panel of
emergency arbitrators designated to rule on emergency applications
will be appointed within one business day.90 Should a party wish to
object to that appointment, it must notify all parties involved in the
proceedings of the reasons for its objection. 91 The emergency
arbitrator will then, within two business days of appointment,
82

Id.
ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(a).
84
See Peter Sherwin & Douglas Campbell Rennie, Interim Relief Under International
Arbitration Rules and Guidlines: A Comparative Analysis, 20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 340,
340-2 (2009).
85
See Mark Friedman et al., International Arbitration, 41 INT’L LAW. 251, 286–7 (2007).
86
See Sherwin & Rennie, supra note 84, at 341; see also Lemenez & Quigley, supra note
80, at 64.
87
See Sherwin & Rennie, supra note 84, at 340.
88
See ICDR Rules, supra note 15.
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Id. art. 37(b).
90
Id. art. 37(c).
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Id.
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establish a schedule for consideration of the application for
emergency relief.92 The ICDR Rules do not set any time limit for
the emergency arbitrator to decide the application.
Similar to the authority of the tribunal, the emergency
arbitrator may award any interim or conservatory measures that the
emergency arbitrator “deems necessary.”93 These measures may
come in the form of an order or an award, “including injunctive
relief and measures for the protection or conservation of property.”94
The emergency arbitrator also has the power to “modify or vacate
the interim award or order for good cause shown.”95 Article 37 also
explicitly provides that the parties may apply to a national court for
interim relief.96
Once the tribunal has been constituted, however, the
emergency arbitrator has no further power.97 The tribunal “may
reconsider, modify or vacate the interim award or order of
emergency relief issued by the emergency arbitrator.” 98 The
emergency arbitrator also may not serve as a member of the
tribunal unless the parties agree otherwise.99 Article 37 has had
success in producing emergency relief since its implementation in
May of 2006. 100 As of October 2008, Article 37 emergency
arbitrators have been appointed in six ICDR cases.101
C. Emergency Arbitrator Procedures Under the China (Shanghai)
Pilot Free Trade Zone Arbitration Rules
Timing of Application for Emergency Arbitrator Procedures
Under the FTZ Arbitration Rules, during the period between
the acceptance of a case and the constitution of the tribunal, a party
may submit a written application to seek interim relief from an
92
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emergency arbitrator.102 The acceptance of a case is defined under
the FTZ Arbitration Rules as the completion of all the formalities of
an Application for Arbitration requested by SHIAC.103
Subsequently, the Secretariat will send a Notice of
Acceptance to the claimant within five days after the completion of
formalities of an Application for Arbitration. The Secretariat has
the duty to send Notice of Arbitration to the respondent within five
days after the Notice of Acceptance is sent104. Similarly, the ICC
Rules allow parties to file an application for emergency arbitrator
procedure even prior to the filing of a Notice of Arbitration, so long
as that Notice of Arbitration is filed within ten days of the
application for emergency arbitrator procedures.105 The ICC Rules
are more flexible than the SIAC Rules, which otherwise only
provide that an application may be submitted concurrent with or
after the commencement of the arbitration.106 However, the FTZ
Arbitration Rules are not as flexible as the ICDR Rules, which
provide that an application for emergency arbitrator procedure may
be submitted any time prior to the constitution of the tribunal, and
does not force parties to wait until the formal acceptance of
arbitration to file an application for emergency arbitrator
procedure.107
Timeframes for Appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator and
Issuance of Decision
First, the FTZ Arbitration Rules provide that the Chairman
of SHIAC may appoint an emergency arbitrator from the Panel of
Arbitrators to constitute the emergency tribunal within three days
upon the completion of formalities.108 However, the ICC, SIAC and
ICDR Rules have imposed even shorter deadlines, requiring
appointment within one or two days.109
102

See FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 21(1).
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Second, the FTZ Rules have expedited the timeframe to
challenge the appointment of the emergency arbitrator, allowing
parties five days to challenge the appointment of an emergency
arbitrator.110 This is still not in accordance with the ICC, SIAC, or
ICDR Rules, which generally have given parties either one or three
days to challenge the appointment of an emergency arbitrator.111
Additionally, the FTZ Rules have not specified the timeframe for
SHIAC to decide on the challenge.112
Furthermore, the SIAC, ICC, and ICDR Rules go one step
further, and require that an emergency arbitrator establish a
schedule for considering the application for emergency relief within
two days of appointment.113 However, the FTZ Arbitration Rules do
not contain such a requirement.
Finally, the FTZ Arbitration Rules provide that the
emergency arbitrator must issue an emergency decision within
twenty days of its appointment, or by the tribunal within twenty
days of its receipt of the application for interim measures.114 This is
generally in accordance with the ICC Rules, which impose a fifteenday deadline for emergency decisions,115 and is much clearer than
the ICDR and SIAC Rules, which impose no concrete deadline at all.
In summary, the FTZ Arbitration Rules set out relatively
quick timelines for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator and
the rendering of a decision, so that the parties can obtain interim
relief as quickly as possible.
Powers of the Emergency Arbitrator
The FTZ Arbitration Rules are silent about whether or not an
emergency arbitrator has the authority to conduct proceedings in
110

FTZ Arbitration Rules, supra note 7, art. 32(1).
ICDR Rules, supra note 15, art. 37(3) (providing for one day to challenge
appointment); SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(3) (providing, similarly, for one day’s
time to challenge appointment); ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, at art. 3(1) (permitting
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SIAC Rules, supra note 15, sched. 1(5) (2013); ICC Rules, supra note 15, app.V, art.
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any manner he considers appropriate, whereas other arbitration
institutions have given the emergency arbitrator maximum
flexibility over procedural matters.116 Although explicitly requiring
the decision to be rendered in writing and in the required format,117
the FTZ Arbitration Rules are silent regarding the type of relief an
emergency arbitrator is authorized to grant. This approach is
similar to the ICC Rules, which are also silent on this issue, but
differs from the ICDR and SIAC Rules, which both explicitly
provide that the emergency arbitrator shall have the power to award
any interim relief he or she deems necessary or appropriate.118
However, the FTZ Arbitration Rules give emergency
arbitrators the power to order that the party seeking emergency
relief post an appropriate security,119 which aligns with international
best practices, as evidenced by the rules of the ICC, SIAC and
ICDR.120
Enforcement of Emergency Decisions
The FTZ Arbitration Rules are silent on whether: (1) an
interim measure rendered by an emergency arbitrator has the same
effect as an interim measure ordered by an arbitral tribunal, (2)
whether the emergency decision is binding on the parties when
rendered, and (3) whether the parties must undertake to comply with
it. However, it can be inferred that an interim measure rendered by
an emergency arbitrator is equally enforceable, binding, and
requires compliance from the fact that the FTZ Arbitration Rules do
not actually distinguish pre-tribunal interim measures from interim
measures granted by the tribunal. Thus, the approach taken by the
FTZ Arbitration Rules is very different from that taken by the ICC
and SIAC Rules, which explicitly provide that a decision rendered
116

Id. at app. V, art. 5(2) (granting broad discretionary powers to conduct proceedings as
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by the emergency arbitrator is binding on the parties, who then must
undertake to comply without delay.121
Effect of an Emergency Decision After Constitution of Tribunal
Under the FTZ Arbitration Rules, the emergency arbitrator
has the discretion to decide whether his emergency decisions should
be modified, suspended, or withdrawn.122 This conforms with the
ICC, SIAC, and ICDR Rules, which also provide that the
emergency arbitrator may modify his own decision.123
The FTZ Arbitration Rules also provide that decisions made
by an emergency arbitrator may be modified, suspended, or
withdrawn by the arbitral tribunal.124 Again, this conforms with the
ICC, SIAC, and ICDR Rules, which contain similar provisions that
confer the arbitral tribunal with the discretion to modify, suspend, or
withdraw the emergency arbitrator’s decision.125 However, other
institutional arbitration rules go slightly further than the FTZ
Arbitration Rules by explicitly providing in their rules that the
emergency arbitrator’s findings do not bind the tribunal. For
example, the ICC Rules provide that the “emergency arbitrator’s
order shall not bind the arbitral tribunal with respect to any question,
issue or dispute determined in the order.”126 Similarly, the SIAC
Rules provide that “the Tribunal is not bound by the reasons given
by the Emergency Arbitrator.”127 In contrast, the FTZ Arbitration
Rules do not explicitly state that the tribunal is not bound by the
emergency arbitrator’s decisions, though this principle is implicit in
the rules granting the arbitral tribunal power to modify, suspend, or
terminate the emergency arbitrator’s decision. 128 The FTZ
Arbitration Rules also state that an emergency decision made by an
emergency arbitrator is subject to objection by the respondent on the
condition that the respondent files a written objection with SHIAC
121
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within three days of the respondent’s receipt of the decision.129 The
emergency tribunal, in rendering such decision on an interim
measure, has the discretion to decide whether to accept the
objection.130 Even after the emergency tribunal rendering such a
decision on an interim measure has dissolved, however, the tribunal
that is subsequently constituted shall have the same discretion.131.
Status of the Emergency Arbitrator After Constitution of Tribunal
Under the FTZ Arbitration Rules, an emergency arbitrator’s
power ceases once the tribunal has been constitutedand the
emergency arbitrator should hand over all materials of the dispute to
the tribunal.132 Similarly, the SIAC and ICDR Rules provide that the
emergency arbitrator has no further power once the tribunal has
been constituted. 133 Furthermore, the FTZ Arbitration Rules
explicitly uphold the superiority of arbitration over the emergency
arbitrator procedure by requiring that the emergency procedure
should not affect the continuation of the arbitration proceedings in
the future.134
The FTZ Arbitration Rules also clearly provide that an
emergency arbitrator should not act as an arbitrator in an arbitration
relating to the dispute that gave rise to the emergency
appointment.135 This resembles the rules of the ICC, SIAC, and
ICDR, all of which contain similar provisions.136

D. Suggestions for Refinement of Emergency Arbitrator
Procedures Under the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade
Zone Arbitration Rules
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As shown above, the new FTZ Arbitration Rules governing
the emergency arbitrator procedure clearly adopt many of the best
practices utilized at other major international arbitration institutions.
Nevertheless, there are still a number of revisions that could be
made to further clarify the emergency arbitrator procedure under the
FTZ Arbitration Rules.
Timing of Application for an Emergency Arbitrator
Because emergency arbitrator procedure is intended to
address situations of extreme urgency, it makes little sense to force
parties to wait until the formal acceptance of arbitration to seek
interim relief through that procedure. Such a formalistic restriction
does not seem to serve any practical purpose, and any concerns
regarding abuse of the emergency arbitrator process could be
addressed by adding a caveat, similar to that included in the ICC
Rules, where an application for an emergency arbitrator is only
valid if a Notice of Arbitration is served shortly thereafter.137 As
such, it may be advisable to revise the FTZ Arbitration Rules to
permit the filing of applications for emergency arbitrators prior to
the formal acceptance of arbitration and after an Application of
Arbitration is filed, so long as the Application of Arbitration is duly
accepted and a Notice of Arbitration is filed shortly afterwards.
This revision would make the emergency arbitrator
procedure better able to address situations of extreme urgency,
instead of forcing parties to apply to local courts just because an
Application of Arbitration has not yet been accepted.
Timeframes for Appointment of an Emergency Arbitrator and
Issuance of Decision
While an improvement over the SHIAC Rules, the FTZ
Arbitration Rules’s provisions regarding timeframes for the
appointment of emergency arbitrators and issuance of decisions still
have room for improvement. Due to the urgent nature of emergency
relief, it may be necessary to explicitly require in the FTZ
137
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Arbitration Rules that the emergency arbitrator sets up a schedule
for considering the application for emergency relief within a certain
period of time after the appointment so that the process will be
expedited.
Powers of Emergency Arbitrators
The FTZ Arbitration Rules already seem to imply that the
emergency arbitrator is authorized to grant any interim relief he or
she deems appropriate, but it may be worth making this broad grant
of authority explicit in the Rules to avoid ambiguities. Moreover, it
may be worth adding provisions to limit the power of emergency
arbitrators under certain circumstances. For example, the ICC
Rules explicitly state that the emergency arbitrator procedure
applies only to signatories to the arbitration agreement or their
successors.138 In other words, the emergency arbitrator does not
have the power to grant interim orders over third parties to the
arbitral proceedings. It may be advisable to add a similar provision
to the FTZ Arbitration Rules, to limit clearly the jurisdiction of
emergency arbitrators.
Enforcement of Emergency Decisions
By not distinguishing an emergency arbitrator’s interim
measures or decisions from the tribunal’s interim measures or
decisions, the FTZ Arbitration Rules seem to imply that an interim
measure ordered by an emergency arbitrator has the same effect as
an interim measure ordered by an arbitral tribunal: the emergency
decision is binding on the parties when rendered, and the parties
undertake to comply with it. However, it also may be worth making
this broad grant of authority explicit in the Rules to avoid
ambiguities.
Effect of Emergency Decisions After Constitution of the Arbitration
Tribunal
The FTZ Arbitration Rules do not explicitly state that the
tribunal is not bound by the emergency arbitrator’s decisions,
though this principle is implicit in the rules granting the arbitral
tribunal power to modify, suspend, or terminate the emergency
138

ICC Rules, supra note 15, art.29(5).

88

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7

arbitrator’s decision. It may nevertheless be worth making this
principle explicit in the FTZ Arbitration Rules, especially with
regard to making it clear that the arbitral tribunal is bound by
neither the decisions nor the reasons given by the emergency
arbitrator.

III. OPEN-LIST ARBITRATOR APPOINTMENTS
A. Arbitrator Appointment Methods in Institutional Arbitration
One of international arbitration’s most crucial stages
concerns the appointment of the arbitrators.139 While the ability of
the parties to select their arbitrators is recognized as one of
arbitration’s most desirable features, the selection phase can be
challenging.140
There are two forms of arbitration: ad hoc arbitration and
institutional arbitration. Both forms have a separate mechanism for
the appointment of arbitrators.141 In ad hoc arbitration, parties make
their own arrangements for the selection of arbitrators and for the
designation of rules, applicable law, procedures, and administrative
support. 142 In contrast, in institutional arbitration, an arbitration
institution administers the arbitral process according to its
institutional rules.143 Although most arbitration institutions firmly
uphold the parties’ rights to choose their arbitrators, their arbitrator
appointment procedures vary at least to the scope of the pool from
which parties can choose their arbitrators 144 . Some arbitration
institutions, ICDR for example, allow the parties to select their
arbitrators freely as the default rule; and if the parties should fail,
the parties are required to select the arbitrators from ICDR’s
previously designated panel of arbitrators comprised of experts
drawn from different parts of the world (Open-List Method).145
139
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Other arbitration institutions, such as CIETAC, use a more
restricted approach under which the arbitrator appointment is
controlled under a closed panel system where, as the default rule,
the parties are only allowed to appoint arbitrators from a panel
previously designated by the relevant arbitration institution (ClosedList Method).146
B. A Comparison of Open-List Method and Closed-List Method
Pros and Cons of Open-List Method
The Open-List Method in recent years has been the subject
of great debate. At the outset, it is undeniable that the principle of
party autonomy is at the heart of international arbitration.147 An
arbitral tribunal exists because the parties have consented to
arbitrate certain disputes, rather than litigate those disputes in a
court as they otherwise have the right to do, and in principle, parties
are free to agree on how they want to appoint a tribunal.148 Many
parties view the right to choose their own arbitrators as one of the
key attractions of international arbitration.149 The proponents of
Open-List Method argue that it is consistent with the principle of
party autonomy and, as arbitration awards are final and not subject
to appeal unless the award is vacated, parties must have a high level
of trust and confidence in the arbitrators they nominate.150 The
Open-List Method maximizes party autonomy by allowing parties
to freely choose their arbitrators and build trust and confidence in
them.151
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Moreover, the level of complexity in many of today’s
international arbitrations requires arbitrators with extensive subject
matter expertise, cultural sensitivity, and a strong foundation in the
conduct of an international arbitration proceeding. Although the
panel under Closed-List Method is often comprised of experts in a
specific area, the Open-List Method brings to the parties a greater
possibility of finding their ideal arbitrators. 152 Nevertheless,
opponents of the Open-List Method have cited the inexperience of
the parties and their inability to make rational decisions regarding
arbitrator appointment as the basis for supporting the Closed List
Method.153
Lastly, the parties always have the expectation that their
nominated arbitrator will see the case their way and will also be able
to sway the other members of the arbitral tribunal.154 Regardless of
the accuracy of this widely shared understanding, under the OpenList Method there is a greater likelihood for the parties to find the
arbitrators who share their view and will zealously advocate for
them in the arbitration process.
However, that is unfortunately where the opponents of
Open-List Method have identified potential problems that may arise,
as it is the norm in international arbitration that all arbitrators be
impartial and independent.155 Some open-list arbitrators may have
the mistaken belief that they have an obligation to the party that
appointed them, which will impede their ability to be impartial,
encourage dilatory tactics or, as some scholars have suggested,
encourage them to draft a dissenting opinion in support of their
parties’ position.156
Pros and Cons of Closed-List Method
Proponents may argue that the Closed-List Method can
avoid appointment bias of the open-list arbitrators in favor of the
appointing party because the Closed-List Method creates an
152
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important buffer between the arbitrators and the parties, thus
removing the potential for the partiality and bias problems. 157
However, a criticism of this view is that requiring parties to appoint
arbitrators from a closed list would not eliminate or significantly
reduce any bias usually seen in open-list arbitrator selection.
Appointment bias arises because an arbitrator believes that
reappointment, by the same party or by others, depends on how
much he or she favors the party that appointed him or her.158 It is
hard to see how inclusion on a closed list would provide such
assurances to arbitrators that they would not consider the effect of
their decisions on future appointments, unless the lists were so
limited as to virtually guarantee appointments. Having a list that is
small enough effectively to eliminate the parties’ freedom of choice
cannot be the objective.159.
Furthermore, the Closed-List Method prevents the ex parte
contact between the parties and the arbitrators and any confusion
over their role or responsibilities towards the party that selected
them.160 This can be a significant advantage in an international
arbitration, especially during enforcement proceedings where these
contacts may later be used to establish the foundation for possible
bias or partiality during an action to vacate an arbitral award.161
Finally, proponents for the Closed-List Method have argued that it
promotes greater coherence in decisionmaking and provides parties
with the ability to access potential arbitrators quickly.162
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However, there seem to be more drawbacks in connection
with the Closed-List Method. The Closed-List Method can make
finding a suitable arbitrator extremely difficult. Finding a suitable
arbitrator among only about several hundred candidates can be
difficult after one takes into account the diverse nature of disputes
even within a specialized field, the avoidance of repeat
appointments, and other conflicts of interest, availability, and
desired qualifications in terms of technical expertise, nationality,
personality, case management skills, and familiarity with the
relevant legal systems.163 While the Closed-List Method provides
the parties with a readily available list of arbitrators, they still might
not be the arbitrators that the parties are contemplating.
The Closed-List Method also gives the arbitration institutions too
much discretion in choosing the closed panel.164 It is very likely that
some arbitration institutions would abuse such discretion to
influence the outcome of the arbitration or simply serve their own
interest.165 The Closed-List Method also arguably poses a hurdle to
new entrants who need to convince an arbitration institution to
include them on their list before being able to receive an
appointment from the arbitration institution or parties arbitrating
before it.
Lastly, internal bodies at arbitration institutions are simply
not in a good position to understand the issues and parties in a
particular case. Institutional staffs are not as well placed to assess
these aspects of an arbitrator’s performance and, in considering who
to appoint, they may prioritize qualities that are helpful from an
administrative and institutional perspective, but may be very
different from the qualities valued by parties and their counsels.
The Closed-List Method Versus Open-List Method of Aribtrator
Appointment
The Closed-List Method is a practice that the legal
community should continue to move away from, rather than move
back to. First, it is necessary to address the bias issue that the
163
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current party appointment system raises, but at the same time, the
Closed-List Method is not the solution. It is questionable that using
a closed list of arbitrators would reduce bias in party-appointed
arbitrators. Any bias-reducing effect that a closed list may have is
likely to be largely offset by the problems that it creates. On the
other hand, the positive effects of the Closed-List Method can also
be accomplished in the Open-List Method with the use of a wellmaintained reference list by which the parties are not confined to.
A reference list, instead of a closed list, would provide a huge
convenience to the parties as well as easy access to qualified
candidates, while showing more respect for party autonomy.
Second, the Open-List Method serves a broader purpose
than the Closed-List Method. By appointing an arbitrator from an
open pool, the parties get a sense of proximity with the arbitral
process. The Open-List Method gives the parties the perception that
they, not the arbitration institution, control the arbitration, which is
an important difference between arbitration and litigation. But the
parties’ trust in the arbitral process is more than just each individual
party’s own trust in its own appointee.
The parties’ trust in the arbitral process is
not the arithmetical addition of each individual
party’s own trust in its own appointee; it is more a
matter of collective trust in the system as a whole, a
trust which rests on a variety of factors, among
which the perception of proximity and control is an
important one.166
Third, the Closed-List Method could create a distance
between the arbitrators and the users of arbitration. Closed-list
arbitrators tend to pay more attention to the arbitration institutions,
which all have their own degree of bureaucracy, rather than the
parties. The risk would exist that arbitrators would progressively
move from their current culture of services providers, close to the
needs and requirements of the users, to a culture of arbitral public
servants or, even worse, of arbitral politicians.167
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C. Closed-List Arbitration Appointment in China
One of the most attractive advantages of arbitration is that
parties can choose their own arbitrators. In the Chinese context,
however, the appointment of arbitrators is controlled under a
closed-panel system where parties are only allowed to appoint
arbitrators listed on a closed panel that is previously appointed by
the relevant arbitration institutions, 168 which is deemed a
quintessential application of the Closed-List Method.
A closed-panel system is not legally compulsory, as the
Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (CAL) 169 does
not expressly provide for a closed panel system. However, upon
closer examination, the closed-panel system may be inferred from
Articles 11 and 13 of the CAL.170 The last paragraph of Article 13
states that an arbitration commission must have a registered panel
list of arbitrators.171 This corresponds to Section 4 of Article 11,
which requires that a Chinese arbitration commission must have its
own appointed arbitrators listed on the panels to be formulated.172
Therefore, the names on the panel lists become a pool for the parties’
appointment of arbitrators when forming the tribunal in an
individual case.173 Despite the above inference, since the CAL does
not provide explicitly that arbitrators must be appointed from the
listed panels of the particular commission, the arbitration
institutions in China still have the discretion of not only controlling
the qualification of arbitrators but also the procedure of arbitrator
appointment.
Generally speaking, China’s closed-panel system has three
distinct features. First, Chinese arbitration institutions tend to
appoint their own staff members as closed-list arbitrators and these
staff-arbitrators are engaged in both administrative and professional
roles.174 Such practice originates from Article 13(1) of the CAL,
168
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which articulates that having previous experience in arbitration
work can be a basis for qualifying as an arbitrator in China.175 And,
this is regarded as an effective means to ensure the standard of its
arbitrators as well as useful to control the quality of arbitration
within the arbitration commission concerned.176 Notably, these staff
arbitrators are usually the powerholders and decisionmakers within
an arbitration institution. Therefore, considering the powerful role
of these staff arbitrators and their special relationship with the
arbitration commission, non-staff arbitrators may be hesitant to
dissent from the opinions of their staff counterparts to avoid
breaking the harmonious relationship within the tribunal177
Second, besides staff arbitrators, many of the panel members
are government officials or retired officials from administrative
authorities178. The arbitration institutions usually appoint officials to
the panel in order to establish good relations with the administrative
authorities to better carry out their work.179 Because government
officials are substantially involved,“[the] interdependent
relationship is established between the arbitration institution and the
official arbitrators appointed to the commission’s panel list”180 is
merely illusory.
Third, “following the dual-track legislative distinction under
the CAL, separate panels are maintained for the appointment of
arbitrators from domestic and foreign nationals."181 As a result,
“[t]he overwhelming understanding therefore is that preferential
treatment has been reserved for parties in foreign-related
arbitration.”182 Moreover, “[t]he dual-track criteria for arbitrators’
appointments were aimed at internationalizing China’s foreignrelated arbitrations, and expediting and expanding China’s
economic and trade relations with other countries.”183
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Recently, a few institutional arbitration rules in China,
which previously only permitted persons listed with a particular
arbitration institution to act as arbitrators in the arbitral proceedings
conducted by that same institution, have began to allow parties to
pick arbitrators off the list, pending confirmation of the chairman of
the arbitration institution involved. For instance, the CIETAC
Rules, after the 2012 update, provide that “[w]here the parties have
agreed to nominate arbitrators outside CIETAC’s panel, an
arbitrator so nominated by the parties or nominated according to the
agreement of the parties may act as arbitrator subject to the
confirmation by the Chairman of CIETAC in accordance with the
law.”184
Few institutional rules require that the arbitrator must appear
on a list maintained by the institution.185 China is perhaps one of the
few jurisdictions in the world that restrict the parties’ choice of
arbitrators to a fixed panel maintained by the arbitration institutions.
In summary, the Chinese practice of closed-list arbitrator
appointment gives a strong impression of state control. It is also
noteworthy that state control has been extended and stressed
through the practice of institutional control by arbitration
institutions.

D. Open-List Method Under the China (Shanghai) Pilot
Free Trade Zone Arbitration Rules and
Recommendation for Refinements
The FTZ Arbitration Rules provides a dual mechanism model
for arbitrator appointment, allowing the parties to choose their
arbitrators either from or outside a list of arbitrators provided by
SHIAC. Pursuant to Article 27 of the FTZ Arbitration Rules,
parties “may either appoint arbitrators from the Panel of Arbitrators
or recommend persons from outside the Panel of Arbitrators as the
184
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arbitrator.” 186 Parties “may also reach an agreement on jointly
recommending a person from outside the Panel of Arbitrators as the
presiding/sole arbitrator.”187 This literally means that the parties will
no longer be bound by a closed list of arbitrators provided by
SHIAC, despite the existence of some ambiguities as to (1) whether
further approval from the Chairman of SHIAC is necessary under
some circumstances and (2) if such approval is necessary, what the
appropriate scope of the Chairman of SHIAC’s review is.
Approval From the Chairman of SHIAC
It is notable that Article 27 uses “recommend” rather than
“appoint” or “nominate.” Arguably recommendations always come
with subsequent ratification or approval actions. However, as
opposed to the CIETAC Rules that explicitly provide that any
nomination of arbitrators outside its panel is subject to the Chairman
of CIETAC’s confirmation,188 the FTZ Arbitration Rules were silent
in Article 27 as to whether the parties’ recommendation is subject to
further approval from SHIAC.189 By contrast, Article 28 of the FTZ
Arbitration Rules prescribe that, in a three-arbitrator tribunal:
[I]f either party has recommended a person
from outside the Panel of Arbitrators to act as
arbitrator, the party shall submit the information
regarding this person to the Secretariat and the
relevant person may act as an arbitrator only when
the Chairman of SHIAC confirms that this is in
accordance with laws.190
Given that only in the situation of a three-arbitrator tribunal
do the FTZ Arbitration Rules explicitly require the Chairman of
SHIAC to approve a party-recommended outside arbitrator and
given their silence about such approval requirement in Article 27, a
more general arbitrator appointment provision, it can be reasonably
inferred from the relevant provisions that other than the
appointment of a three-arbitrator tribunal, the Chairman of SHIAC’s
186
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approval is not necessary and the parties thus can make their own
choices.
The Scope of Review
Even though in a three-arbitrator tribunal scenario, the
parties are still obligated to submit their recommendations of
outside arbitrators to the Chairman of SHIAC for approval, while
the scope of the Chairman’s review is very narrow. Pursuant to
Article 28, the Chairman of SHIAC only has the authority to
confirm that recommendations of outside arbitrator are in
accordance with the law.191 Under such an objective standard, under
no condition except that a recommendation is unlawful can the
Chairman of SHIAC reject a recommendation of an outside
arbitrator. Other Chinese institutional arbitration rules however,
such as the CIETAC Rules, generally confer the chairman with a
discretionary confirmation authority as long as he exercises it in
accordance with law.192
The FTZ Arbitration Rules have only became effective
recently, in May 2014, and could be interpreted in many different
ways in the future. However, the language in the FTZ Arbitration
Rules certainly reveals the intention of SHIAC to at least move
away from Closed-List Method toward a more liberalized procedure
of arbitrator appointment.
The FTZ Arbitration Rules are capable of going further with
their liberalization initiatives. Also the apparent ambiguities need to
be eliminated. Accordingly, the following are recommendations for
refinement of the current FTZ Arbitration Rules with regard to
arbitrator appointments.
First, the dual mechanism model is redundant. By allowing
the parties to choose their own arbitrators, the FTZ Arbitration
Rules have rendered SHIAC’s closed list of arbitrators meaningless.
The better way is to include a reference list that includes all SHIACappointed arbitrators as suggestions for the parties to consider and
to state that the parties are free to select other arbitrators not on the
191
192
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list. The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC), for
example, has established a panel of arbitrators selected for high
expertise and professionalism. 193 Besides the panel members
published on its website, the HKIAC also maintains a database of
other arbitrators who, although not meeting the Panel Selection
Committee’s criteria for inclusion on the panel, may yet be
suggested to parties in suitable cases requiring specialist expertise.194
As such, parties may have a larger pool from which they can
draw their prospective arbitrators. Most significantly, however, the
parties are allowed to appoint arbitrators from outside the
institution’s panels and databases.195 Thus, the principle of party
autonomy is both observed and balanced against an institutional
culture of maintaining a pool of high-standard arbitrators available
for the parties to select from.
In addition, the FTZ Arbitration Rules need to be revised to
explain the meaning of a “recommendation” and to make clear
whether further approval from the Chairman of SHIAC is required.
It matters because the existence of an approval requirement in the
FTZ Arbitration Rules will certainly discount the function of the
Open-List Method.
Lastly, as the Open-List Method is relatively new to the
parties conducting institutional arbitration in China, it would help
the inexperienced parties to properly appoint their arbitrators if the
FTZ Arbitration Rules included detailed guidelines of the
qualifications that a competent arbitrator should possess in order to
produce a fair judgment for both parties. This would not only
promote the principle of party autonomy, but would also help the
arbitration institutions in China to better perform their
administrative duties.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The implications of both emergency arbitrator procedure and
open-list arbitrator appointment included in the FTZ Arbitration
Rules are groundbreaking. One implication is that it is the first time
that an arbitration institution in China has ever used the Open-List
Method in its arbitrator appointment rules, suggesting a possible
trend of more arbitration institutions in China to follow suit.
Another implication is that emergency arbitrator procedure and
open-list arbitrator appointment appear to be just two outstanding
examples of several breakthroughs SHIAC has made in the FTZ
Arbitration Rules, nearly all of which were carefully made based on
generally accepted international arbitration practice and principles.
To some extent, this illustrates the fact that SHIAC is working hard
to accommodate the expectations of foreign investors to have a
modern, consistent, and fair dispute resolution system in Shanghai
FTZ with a more diversified pool of arbitrators and thereby
strengthen confidence in investing in Shanghai FTZ.

